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chapter 9
Nat Turner and the African American Revolution
With what execrations should the statesman be loaded who, permit-
ting one half the citizens thus to trample on the rights of the other,
transforms those into despots and these into enemies.
– Thomas Jefferson, 17821
I
It might not be immediately apparent that Hobbes’s Leviathan has some-
thing to contribute to our understanding of the panic generated by, and
the political philosophy implicit in, African American slave rebellion. But
by advancing this claim, I also want to suggest that attention to the his-
tory and literature of anti-slavery will help us to come to a better under-
standing of Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty. In particular, slave rebellion
clarifies Hobbes’s originality in relation to what is sometimes called the
de facto theory of sovereignty that was in circulation in the seventeenth
century. In a valuable recent study of Hobbes’s political philosophy, Kinch
Hoekstra identifies three broad scholarly approaches to Hobbes’s model of
sovereignty. According to Hoekstra, Hobbes’s various readers have painted
him as a “Royalist (because he asserts “that the king has sovereign author-
ity even while a usurper holds sway”); a “de facto” theorist of sovereignty
(“As he maintains that the possession of power gives rise to authority and
obligation”); and a “consent theorist” (because he claims that obligation
and authority depend on the agreement of the ruled”). The three theories,
Hoekstra adds, “appear to be inconsistent” (34).2 But as I hope to show,
and as Hoekstra also suggests, the inconsistency actually marks a radical
departure. “Hobbes attempts to undermine the Aristotelian bifurcations
between tyrant and king and between despotical and political rule,” writes
Hoekstra, just as he “strives to disable the distinction between de facto and
de jure rule that underlies these [oppositions]” (69). Once again, a vilified
Hobbesian absolutism works to conceal a crucial deconstruction.
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Hobbes entered into the urgent contemporary debate over the implica-
tions of usurped power by refusing to completely oppose authority seized
by force to authority legitimated by consent.3 In Chapter 20 of Leviathan,
as we have seen, Hobbes retains a crucial place for the act of “submis-
sion” to the victor, and hence, in his “Review and Conclusion,” he defines
“conquest” as “the Acquiring of the Right of Soveraignty by Victory. Which
Right, is acquired, in the peoples Submission, by which they contract
with the Victor, promising Obedience, for Life and Liberty” (486). The
commingling of right and contract with victory and submission in such
passages, scandalizes a liberal model of political legitimacy, but it is no less
disturbing to defenders of Royalist prerogative. “Taken on its own,” writes
Hoekstra, “this insistence on founding de jure authority on the consent of
the people is more like the view of Milton than of Ascham, or Nedham, or
a traditional royalist” (59).4 “Hobbes,” Hoekstra remarks, “forges a closer
link between obedience and right” than any of his contemporaries, and
he can be heard repeating this unorthodox link in the final chapter of
Leviathan, when he suggests that his design has been “to set before men’s
eyes the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience” (491). “For
Hobbes,” writes Hoekstra, “political obligation and authority depend on
popular consent, the traditional requirement of the revolutionary” (59).
But, as Quentin Skinner has also recently acknowledged, Hobbes’s scene
of founding consent, unlike that described by the dominant Republican
tradition, could take place at the tip of a sword and could involve a life or
death decision. The defeated individual who decides not to concede his or
her life also exercises consent, Hobbes argues, and insofar as it founds a new
political order, that consent is no less just or legitimate (although it may
be more precarious) than the kind of consent idealized by the Republican
tradition. “If we are to be justly abridged of our natural liberty,” writes
Skinner, whether by a communally generated representative power or a
victorious invader, “such an abridgment can take place only with our own
consent; otherwise we shall be reduced to the condition not of a subject but
a slave” (200). The effect of this reinterpretation is to open up the category
of consent to an externality – a supplementary force – that what Skinner
calls “Republican liberty” strenuously sought to exclude.5 “‘The vote of
the people is the voice of God,’” said Edward Gee in 1649, articulating a
familiar Presbyterian claim; and, as such, it founded a political commu-
nity untainted by “‘injurious and forcible entrance’” (qtd. in Skinner, 199).
For Hobbes, however, such formulations not only disavowed (shamefully)
the revolutionary violence that brought down Charles I; they also had the
peculiar effect of removing the decision to live, the decision taken at the
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point of a sword, from the realm of consent and thus from the realm of
any kind of meaningful political decision. This peculiar state of suspended
agency, as we shall see, has particular significance for the history and theory
of anti-slavery in the United States.
Before we proceed, however, I want to pick up on two key terms in
Skinner’s gloss of Hobbes’s theory of consent. “If we are to be justly abridged
of our natural liberty,” writes Skinner, “such an abridgment can take place
only with our own consent; otherwise we shall be reduced to the condition
not of a subject but a slave” (200). For Skinner, Hobbesian consent, no
matter how uniquely expansive it may be, must not be at odds with a scene
of natural liberty “justly abridged.” But the status of this abridgement,
with respect to justice, is a difficult, yet crucial aspect of Hobbesian theory.
Hobbes holds open a place in the structure of his commonwealth not just
for consent given in the face of a lethal threat but also for a violence that is
undecidable with respect to justice. In the scene Skinner describes, it is not
simply in order for justice to be done that the defeated must consent to the
new order. The only alternative to consent in this scene is death: consent
produces a new sovereign community and justice, so to speak, has nothing
to do with it. The inclusion of a passage through the undecidability of this
justice is crucial to Hobbes’s theory and marks his importance both for
counter-liberal political praxis and for deconstructive political philosophy.
This suspense of undecidability with respect to justice cannot be reduced
or wished away for any community – which is to say, for any attempt to live
together peacefully and, yes, justly. Hence, this undecidability also defines
Hobbesian sovereignty as a constitutive supplementarity. For Hobbes, the
scene of consent given at the tip of a sword, far from constituting a nullified
or enslaved consent, actually tells us something (albeit in hyperbolic form)
about the supplementary structure of all consent.6
Skinner’s remarks also make an important reference to slavery as the
precise name for a condition in which consent plays no part. Republican
or liberal revolutionary discourse, as we know, privileges the figure of the
subject reduced to slavery by one or another embodiment of monarchic
tyranny.7 Central to this rhetoric is the claim that decisions made at the
point of a sword (and, pre-eminently, decisions over whether or not to
to remain alive or accept death at the hands of another) are not really
decisions at all: such scenes are already, for the liberal revolutionary, scenes
of enslavement. But from the eighteenth century on, as we know all too
well, the violent contradiction between republican cries of “slavery!” and
the proliferating institution of African enslavement generated very little
anxiety on the part of an expanding economy ever more dependent on the
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free and stolen labour of others. And while most condemnations of this
contradiction took (and continue to take) the form of a shaming gaze on
the hypocritical white revolutionary, a Hobbesian perspective reminds us
to look again at the enslaved and ask whether the liberal theory of freedom
doesn’t also (and perhaps crucially) deprive slaves of a very particular form
of political power. Determined to preserve founding consent from any
interfering externality (proceeding as if, Hobbes would have said, an object
could move itself by itself ), and committed, above all, to the fantasy that
its own sovereign authority was uncontaminated by violence, Republican
liberty paradoxically abandoned the desire to live or die to a state of political
limbo (the choice that is not really a choice) and thereby confined the slave
to a “state of nature” condition in which his or her revolutionary will was
made to coincide with a conceptual monstrosity. In other words, the refusal
to recognize consent taking place upon pain of death marks the appearance
of a political class that is convinced it has reached the end of history and
realized the perfect alignment of might and right: “‘The vote of the people
is the voice of God.’”
In Les Six livres de la République (1576), one of the most influential
treatises on sovereignty, Jean Bodin suggested that a sovereign who has
come to power by way of violence or usurpation would be well advised
to kill those who had plotted against the old sovereign and facilitated his
usurpation. “It is an even worse mistake,” writes Bodin, “to give rewards
to those who killed a tyrant and thereby smoothed the successors’ path
to sovereignty. For the lives of the successors will never be secure unless
they punish the assassins as Emperor Severus very wisely did in putting
to death all those who had a part in the murder of Emperor Pertinax”
(124). Machiavelli comes close to such a position, too, when he says that
a new prince might be well advised to distrust, if not simply do away
with, those who helped him to oust the old prince: “it is much more easy
for [the prince] to win to himself as friends those men who used to be
content under the previous state than those who, because they were not
content with it, became his friends and favored him in occupying it” (107).
Bodinian and Machiavellian princes thus anticipate the liberal democratic
state that, as Walter Benjamin suggested (in “Critique of Violence”), relates
to violence not as that which it must work to reduce but as that which it
constantly seeks to monopolize. The transition from one sovereign regime
to another (via revolutionary or treasonous violence) must itself be erased
or concealed in the Bodinian polity, and this imperative helps to explain
why Bodin (anticipating English defenders of the divine right of kings)
insists that the coronation ceremony itself does not confer sovereignty;
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316050835.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Toronto, on 11 Nov 2019 at 14:00:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Nat Turner and the African American Revolution 211
there must be no caesura in sovereignty: “For it is beyond doubt that
the king never dies, as they say, and that as soon as one is deceased the
nearest male of his stock is seized of the kingdom and in possession thereof
before he is crowned. It is not passed by right of succession from the
father but rather in virtue of the kingdom’s law” (44).8 Bodin’s theory of
sovereignty thus feeds into the Elizabethan conception of the king’s two
bodies insofar as it proposes a sovereignty that survives any and every act
of revolution or regicide. Bodin and Machiavelli’s princes augment their
power by literally burying the relationship between their new order and
the violence of founding.
By insisting on consent purified of any relation to external force (epito-
mized in the decision to exchange obedience for survival), liberal political
orthodoxy inherits the classical monarchic sovereign’s desire to monopo-
lize violence (and the U.S. Constitution’s invocation of a power to suspend
habeas corpus in the name of public safety, as we have seen, exemplifies
this gesture). The consistent reliance on one or another state of emergency
throughout the history of what we like to think of as our democratic
modernity, as Giorgio Agamben has effectively demonstrated, records a
Bodinian or Machiavellian sense that sovereign power has to protect itself
not only from its own domestic and international enemies, but also from its
own aporetic origins – from its constitutive and thus ongoing relationship
to the undecidable and supplementary violence of Hobbesian sovereignty.
Hobbesian sovereignty, to put this another way, refuses to immunize any
state from the revolutionary violence that marks its beginning and inscribes
the promise or chance of democracy in its future.
II
In August 1861, T. W. Higginson, Unitarian minister, abolitionist, literary
editor, and colonel of the First South Carolina Volunteers (the first black
regiment in the Union army), published an essay in the Atlantic Monthly on
“Nat Turner’s Insurrection.”9 His account documents the “terrible work”
of Turner and his men (“what agonies of terror must have taken place
within, shared alike by innocent and by guilty!” [251]), but it is unflinching
in its defense:
These negroes had been systematically brutalized from childhood; they had
been allowed no legalized or permanent marriage; they had beheld around
them an habitual licentiousness, such as can scarcely exist except in a Slave
State; some of them had seen their wives and sisters habitually polluted by
the husbands and the brothers of those fair white women who were now
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absolutely in their power. Yet I have looked through the Virginia newspapers
of that time in vain for one charge of an indecent outrage on a woman against
these triumphant and terrible slaves. Wherever they went, there went death,
and that was all. (251–52)
Higginson’s account follows Turner as the insurrection falters and collapses
and its leader is forced to hide out alone in the woods: “What a watch he
must have kept that night! To that excited imagination, which had always
seen spirits in the sky and blood-drops on the corn and hieroglyphic marks
on the dry leaves, how full the lonely forest must have been of signs and
solemn warnings!” (254). While Turner survives alone in the woods for
six weeks, terror spreads through the south: “Indeed, the most formidable
weapon in the hands of slave insurgents is always this blind panic they
create, and the wild exaggerations which follow. The worst being possible,
every one takes the worst for granted” (255).
Higginson includes, in his essay on Nat Turner, what he calls a “touching
story” which he received from a Rev. M. B. Cox, a Liberian missionary, then
in Virginia. It tells of a “faithful slave” who had protected his master from
Turner’s band and who accompanied his master into the woods during the
search for Turner that followed the insurrection:
When they had reached a retired place in the forest, the man handed his
gun to his master, informing him that he could not live a slave any longer,
and requesting him either to free him or shoot him on the spot. The master
took the gun, in some trepidation, leveled it at the faithful negro, and shot
him through the heart. (260)
This minimal story powerfully recalls those moments in Hobbes’s theoret-
ical account of dominion and servitude when a subject is said to be faced
with a stark choice. “Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war,”
writes Hobbes, “is that which some writers call DESPOTICALL. . . . And
this Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to
avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or
by other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty
of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his
pleasure” (141). As we have seen, Hobbes scandalized many of his readers
by suggesting that this scenario might describe the beginning of a political
state in which sovereign power is still in some kind of relation of depen-
dence with consent. By “choosing” not to forfeit his life, the subject of this
new dominion by victory does acquire sovereign representation, Hobbes
suggests, even if it is only the minimal representation of his own desire
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not to die. This conquered subject may recognize few of his or her par-
ticular interests in the new sovereign order, but he will at least recognize a
co-incidental commitment to his or her own (mere) survival: the sovereign
power and I become indistinguishable only at the point of an investment
in my continued existence. Needless to say, this is a precarious sovereign
relationship, but until the moment at which either the sovereign power
loses all interest in that subject’s survival or the moment at which that
subject finds mere life insufficiently rewarding, that sovereign structure of
consent and of minimal representational relationality persists.
In the story recounted by Higginson, such a moment of sovereign col-
lapse seems to take place. The slave refuses, any longer, to choose even
bare existence under slavery. For Higginson, this is not simply a moment
of despair. The Richmond Enquirer, in a sickening display of Southern
“chivalry,” relates the story of the “faithful” slave who is shot by the mas-
ter he had protected and remarks: “‘If this be true . . . great will be the
desert of these noble-minded Africans’” (qtd. in Higginson, 260). But
Higginson is indignant: “This ‘noble-minded African,’ at least, estimated
his own desert at a high standard: he demanded freedom, – and obtained
it” (260). Standing in the Virginia woods (perhaps only feet away from
Turner’s hiding place?) this enslaved African reached a border crossing. He
deposed the minimal sovereignty he recognized in his master’s power of
life and death over him and forced the white man to effect his exit from
this political space. What is striking about Higginson’s remark is that this
Unitarian minister should so pointedly redirect attention away from the
afterlife invoked by the Enquirer (“great will be the desert . . . ”) to rewrite
the African’s last act as a demand, here and now, made upon the white
man – a demand that is it’s own reward. In the absence of the slave’s
desire to live under the current regime, the white man loses power and
becomes, himself, subject to an order he cannot refuse. Higginson refers to
this event as a successful demand for freedom, and by doing so he breaks
with that liberal political philosophy which, as we have seen, rejected the
possibility that “death” could ever function as an option within a scene of
consent. Freedom (or revolution), for the slave in the woods, coincides with
the possibility of choosing one’s own dissolution, which is to say, register-
ing an opening onto an absolute alterity as something other than disaster.
The slave’s death, moreover, functions, in this instance not only as the
sovereign supplement of a new state of freedom for the African; the white
slavemaster is forced into this state, too. The sovereign “life” of the slave
that had hitherto bound the white man and the African in their horrifi-
cally minimal community is dissolved by the black man and replaced by
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a sovereign power (the African’s death) that the white man has to submit to
Liberalism’s refusal to identify freedom with any exposure to alterity (epit-
omized in the self’s willed self-annihilation) looks, from this perspective,
like a discourse designed to invalidate in advance what must have been
one of pro-slavery’s greatest fears: politically mobilized slave suicide (or
what Officers in Guantanamo notoriously referred to as the “asymmetrical
warfare” of the prisoners who were “found” hanging in their cells in June
of 2006).10
The slave’s demand – kill me or set me free – makes a poignant political
and philosophical point by suggesting that even the slaveholding white
man requires, and is beholden to, a sovereign other. Even slavery, in other
words, requires a point where the interests of the slaveholder and the slave
coincide (the point, for example, of a shared desire for the “life” of the
African). This shared desire, as long as it lasts, marks a precarious sovereign
identification of “white” and “black” in nineteenth-century America that
cannot be wholly identified with or appropriated by either. 11 As the scene
in the woods demonstrates with such pathos, this bare sovereignty exceeds
them both. The sovereign “life” that here binds the enslaved and the
white slaver in what we no doubt think of as an extremely frail and
horrific “community” cannot be reduced either to a metaphysically or
humanistically imagined full “humanity” or to a merely commodified
objectification. The white man is forced to acknowledge the life of his
slave either by freeing him (which is to say, effectively renouncing slavery)
or by “killing” his “property.” If this scene can be read as something other
than one of failed revolt, in other words, it is because the slave has put his
“master” in a position from which the latter cannot but acknowledge and
perform the shared “life” of the two – their cohabitation of a community
bound together by the supplementary and “artificial” sovereignty of a “life”
that cannot be reduced to either “mere” materiality or metaphysical ideal.
Higginson is able to identify this slave’s death as a successful act of
resistance because he implicitly recognizes the idea that, in the case of
slavery, choosing one’s own death marks the point at which an economic
violence (the exploitation of the life and humanity of Africans) crosses
paths with an ideological mantra (liberalism’s insistence on the purity of
a self-contained and deathless consent). One way or another, this scene in
the woods gathers its political and emotive force from its activation of a
correspondence between slave revolt and the introduction of a sovereign
supplement of consent such as is described by Hobbes in his Leviathan. If
the black man’s death here carries such emotive weight, it is in part because
we can read a certain sovereign power at work in this death. And while
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the tendency, not surprisingly, would be to allegorize that sovereignty in
religious terms (“great will be the desert of these noble-minded Africans”),
Higginson insists on giving it a decidedly earthly and immediate reading
(“he demanded freedom, and he got it”). From the perspective of liberal
orthodoxy, this sovereignty names a bastard or monstrous form of, or
interruption of, “freedom.” But, as such, this strange new sovereignty also
anticipates another America, an America in which black and white lives
would matter equally.12 The unnamed African man in the forest scene forces
this new sovereign invention, this new (“black” and “white”) humanity,
onto his “master.” But he does so via a relation to death that reminds us
that the sovereignty at work here, as in Hobbes’s Leviathan, can no longer
simply be reduced to or equated with a living, intentional presence. Revo-
lutionary (Hobbesian) sovereignty is necessarily “deterritorialized” and is
ontologically as well as logically ambiguous. Hobbesian sovereignty binds
persons only insofar as it resists being bound itself by the living.
The slave described in Higginson’s secondhand story, the slave who
presents his master with an ultimatum, might be said to have made his
intervention passively, and at the cost of his life; but his action also exercised
a kind of force and the analysis that we have just brought to bear on his
death accords well with numerous other scenes of slave suicide and with
the analysis of “death as agency” in the work of Orlando Patterson, Paul
Gilroy, Ronald Takaki, and others. Slaveowning culture, I have been argu-
ing, is propped on and continuously dependent on an implicit disavowal
of a model of sovereignty and community that was central to Hobbesian
political philosophy. The slave in the woods, by forcing his master to free
or kill him, implicitly acknowledges and deploys the structural place of
a Hobbesian, rather than a contractually based, liberal sovereignty in the
relationship between his master and himself.13 This sovereignty, I would
contend, needs to be recognized as crucially distinct from, and indeed
antagonistic toward, the model of sovereignty that orchestrates colonial,
capitalist (and thoroughly racialized) exploitation. “Both the project of
modernity,” writes Achille Mbembe, “and . . . the topos of sovereignty” can
be traced back to a privileging of reason as the defining feature of “men
and women . . . posited as full subjects capable of self-understanding, self-
consciousness, and self-representation” and to a politics conceived of as
“a project of autonomy and the achieving of agreement among a collec-
tivity through communication and recognition” (13). Mbembe’s vocabu-
lary here is critical. The closed economy of “self-representation” that, he
argues, is central to a modernity from which we are still trying to escape
is not a Hobbesian political economy. Precisely at the point at which it
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interrupts a logic of “communication” and “agreement” via the language
of representation (not “self-representation”) and arbitrariness, Hobbesian
sovereignty challenges the privileging of “reason” and “autonomy” in the
“modern” Western tradition. “The romance of sovereignty,” Mbembe con-
tinues, “rests on the belief that the subject is the master and the controlling
author of his or her own meaning. Sovereignty is therefore defined as a
twofold process of self-institution and self-limitation (fixing one’s own limits
for oneself )” (14). But what Mbembe is describing and critiquing here is
precisely that version of Lockean, liberal sovereignty that came to displace
and wholly discredit the scandal of Hobbes.
Bringing his master into the woods, the slave recalled in Higginson’s
story, also brings his master, so to speak, into the presence of a sovereignty
that “modernity” (to use Mbembe’s word) had refused to recognize. Slavery
had depended all along, and in numerous ways, on the shared “humanity”
of whites and blacks; but it also depended on the disavowal of that sovereign
identification. The fleeting reference to the master’s “trepidation” in the
account Higginson relays hints at a sublime revelation that took place in
the woods but that also took place all over the South, time and time again
both before and after Nat Turner’s insurrection.14
III
It is a commonplace to assert that the hero of Frederick Douglass’s 1845
autobiography was both a writer and a fighter. But readers tend to prefer
the idea that “literacy” showed Douglass the way to freedom: “I now
understood what had been to me a most perplexing difficulty,” writes
Douglass with reference to Mr. Auld’s comments on teaching a slave to
read”: “– to wit, the white man’s power to enslave the black man. It was
a grand achievement. . . . From that moment I understood the pathway
from slavery to freedom” (Autobiographies, 37–38). But we needn’t forget
Douglass’s other “achievement” – his two-hour battle with the man who
“rented” him from his owner in 1834: “This battle with Mr. Covey was
the turning-point in my career as a slave . . . it recalled the departed self-
confidence, and inspired me again with a determination to be free” (65).
And although he did not ultimately join John Brown on his raid into
Virginia, Douglass was far from being a pacifist. A slyly ambiguous force
also creeps into his advocacy of black enlistment during the Civil War:
“Once let the black man get upon his person the brass letters U.S.,” wrote
Douglass, “let him get an eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder,
and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on the earth or under the
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earth which can deny that he has earned the right of citizenship in the
United States” (“Address,” 536). Without a doubt, Douglass is eager to
promote the image of black men pointing their guns at the enemies of the
Union; but he was surely also reminding his black readers that achieving
full citizenship meant accession to the force that is structured into all
sovereign community. “A ballot is like a bullet,” wrote one of Douglass’s
twentieth-century readers. “You don’t throw your ballots until you see a
target, and if that target is not within your reach, keep your ballot in your
pocket.”15
Douglass rejected the simple opposition between physical violence and
written attempts to effect political change, because he had a powerful
sense of rhetoric as force. The “scorching irony” he called for in his 1852
Independence Day speech was meant to introduce the smell of burning
flesh into the room: “At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing
argument is needed . . . it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the
gentle shower, but thunder. We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the
earthquake” (“The Meaning of July Fourth,” 196). It’s worth emphasiz-
ing this blurring of the distinction between rhetorical and what we might
call “actual” violence in Douglass’s activism, because a simple opposition
between the two is part of what lies behind a failure to gauge the political
philosophy of slave insurrection.16 In his remarks on slavery in 1782,
Thomas Jefferson fears God’s vengeance but consoles himself with the
kind of hope to which a deist might be expected to turn:
The Almighty has no attributes which can take side with us in such a contest.
But it is impossible to be temperate and to pursue this subject through the
various considerations of policy, of morals, of history natural and civil. We
must be contented to hope they will force their way into every one’s mind. (Notes,
84, emphasis mine)
Jefferson prays that antislavery sentiment will force its way into Ameri-
can minds before God or his lieutenants start drawing blood or taking
prisoners. One way or another, he seems to suggest, white Americans had
better prepare to be subjected to a force they cannot master; only “force”
can save (white) America from itself. Nevertheless, his words also register
a desire to distinguish the force of ideas from material violence according
to a logic that slavery and antislavery agitation prompts us to question.
What I have been trying to read as a profoundly anti-Hobbesian strain
in the dominant discourse of liberal, Protestant modernity not only pro-
voked and facilitated the phenomenon of Atlantic slavery; it did so, in
part, by disavowing the relationship between sovereignty and force that
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Hobbes so carefully attempted to understand. Jefferson’s implicit distinc-
tion between bloody revolution and ideational transformation gives us
one version of this disavowal; the hysterical demonization of the figure of
the violent African slave provides another. The Hobbesian insistence on
noncontractual sovereignty as irreducible for any community is systemat-
ically and desperately repudiated by the very discourse that made chattel
slavery possible; and the phantasmatic discourse of the monstrous black
rebel participated in that repudiation in the nineteenth-century United
States. Hobbesian sovereignty, as we have seen, has a necessarily exces-
sive relationship to the community it represents and invents. That excess,
which bears a crucial relationship to the mediatory force of language and
to the irreducibility of a violence that is “neither just nor unjust,” opens
up a space for politics and for the social. In the revolutionary or founding
moment, such as that moment opened up by anti-slavery advocates in the
nineteenth century, the conceptual site of this sovereign excess becomes
barely distinguishable from the site of a specific historical demand. The
“awe” associated with Hobbesian sovereignty becomes synchronized with
the “terror” of revolutionary violence. One of the names that came to be
most powerfully associated in American minds with a terrifying version of
abolitionist force (and, thus, with a disavowed recognition of Hobbesian
sovereignty) was that of Nat Turner.
Higginson’s design in his Atlantic Monthly essay on Turner is not simply
to tell the story of the rebellion and its subjugation. He draws our attention,
for example, to the “Richmond Enquirer” for September 6, 1831, in which
“indignant descriptions of Russian atrocities in Lithuania, where the Poles
were engaged in active insurrection,” are presented “amid profuse sympa-
thy from Virginia.” These very accounts are printed, Higginson notes, in
parallel columns with denunciations of Turner’s insurrection taken from
an official document by General Eppes, in which Turner’s “acts of bar-
barity and cruelty . . . inhuman and not to be justified” are condemned
as unworthy of any response short of immediate execution; any kind of
legal proceeding whatsoever, the General complains, “dignifies the rebel
and the assassin with the sanctity of martyrdom’” (qtd. in Higginson, 256).
Higginson then proceeds to document what he calls the true “Reign of
Terror” that follows the rebellion. An “‘indiscriminate slaughter of the
blacks who were suspected’” could not be prevented, testified Gen-
eral Brodnax before the House of Delegates (257). Higginson is deter-
mined to shock his readers. “Men were tortured to death, burned,
maimed, and subjected to nameless atrocities” (257). He then thanks Lydia
Maria Child for passing on the direct testimony of Charity Bowery, an
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“old colored woman” from New York, who had told her about life “at the
time of the old Prophet Nat”:
The brightest and best was killed in Nat’s time. The whites always suspect
such ones. They killed a great many at a place called Duplon. They killed
Antonio, a slave of Mr. J. Stanley, whom they shot; then they pointed their
guns at him, and told him to confess about the insurrection. He told ‘em
he didn’t know anything about the insurrection. They shot several balls
through him, quartered him, and put his head on a pole at the fork of the
road leading to the court. (qtd. in Higginson, 258)
Accounts of the events in Virginia in 1831, whether given by pro- or anti-
slavery historians, might be read to suggest that a prototypical Hobbesian
“state of nature,” a condition of “war of all against all” had broken out
and threatened to engulf the South. But this would be to misunderstand
the full import of Hobbes’s conceptual device. In fact, the phenomenon of
chattel slavery and the violence it effected and provoked demands a more
nunanced understanding of the deconstructibility of Hobbes’s hypothetical
opposition between the “state of nature” and the “commonwealth.” We
ought to be hesitant, in other words, before declaring with certainty that
we know the geographical or temporal borders of such a state.17 Recall
Hobbes’s brief but crucial reference to the difference between a slave and a
servant in Chapter 20 of Leviathan:
for by the word Servant (whether it be derived from Servire, to Serve, or
from Servare, to Save . . . ) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison,
or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him, of one that
did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called
Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison;
and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being
taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run
away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him. (141)
Hobbes’s prose bears the traces of an uncharacteristic conceptual strug-
gle here, because, I would suggest, he has only just begun to discern
the contours of a historically novel and theoretically crucial politico-legal
condition: modern chattel slavery. The “slave” is distinguished, for the
purposes of Hobbes’s political philosophy, by this key fact: the slave can
“kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly.” The vocabulary here is
pointed. Hobbes uses the word “Master” under erasure (so to speak): he
whom one can kill “justly” is not, by the terms of Hobbes’s own analysis,
one whom one encounters in anything but a state of nature condition. A
slave “Master,” in other words, is not a Hobbesian “sovereign.” But slavery,
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as even Hobbes would have known, was a rapidly developing phenomenon
within the sovereign command of major European powers. Backed by the
full force of the law, slave masters in the Atlantic world often acted as
proxy sovereigns. What is happening, then, when Hobbes, the so-called
defender of statist absolutism, describes the killing of slave masters as an
example of “just” violence? Slavery, we would have to conclude, names an
institution of modernity that cannot be understood in terms of any strict
distinction between the state of nature and the commonwealth. And slave
violence, as just violence, inscribes revolution in Hobbes’s political philos-
ophy precisely at the point where such a distinction deconstructs (the point
at which it becomes difficult to distinguish“just” violence from that “state
of nature” violence that is “neither just nor unjust”). To put this another
way, Leviathan has no place within its schema for slavery except as the
name for a state of permanent revolution – a state that activates the border
between the state of nature and the commonwealth. The repudiation of
Hobbesian political philosophy in the eighteenth century was generated, in
part, by a more or less explicit registration of that philosophy’s incompat-
ibility with the chattel slavery that became increasingly intertwined with
capitalist expansion and liberal hegemony.18
The abomination of slavery, from a Hobbesian perspective, coincides
with the conceptual impossibility of the slave’s politico-legal subjectivity.
The slave is not simply located outside the law or, indeed, on the outside
of humanity. The slave finds herself both inside and outside a sovereign
commonwealth, subject to a law before which she has no standing, and on
both sides of a putative distinction between the human and the subhuman.
Higginson captures a particularly grotesque instance of this duplicity in his
essay on Nat Turner. Scrutinizing the newspaper accounts of Turner’s trial
and execution, Higginson notes a reference to the hanging that became part
of Turner lore: “Not a limb nor a muscle was observed to move” (266).19
But the newspaper account continues: “His body, after his death, was given
over to the surgeons for dissection” (266).20 Higginson dwells on this detail
and on the rumor that had circulated, after Turner’s death, to the effect that
the prisoner had been “compelled to sell his body in advance, for purposes
of dissection, in exchange for food” (266). Higginson is suspicious, and his
voracious reading feeds his doubt:
In the circular of the South Carolina Medical School for that very year I
find this remarkable suggestion: – “Some advantages of a peculiar character
are connected with this institution. No place in the United States affords
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so great opportunities for the acquisition of medical knowledge, subjects
being obtained among the colored population in sufficient number for
every purpose, and proper dissections carried on without offending any
individual.”
“What a convenience,” writes Higginson, with perfectly calibrated scorn,
“to possess for scientific purposes a class of population sufficiently human
to be dissected, but not human enough to be supposed to take offence at
it!” (266). Turner would hardly have needed to go through “the formality of
selling his body,” Higginson concludes, “to those who claimed its control
at any rate” (266).
Higginson’s example signals a broader phenomenon whereby the very
categorical absurdity – the undecidability – of the African in America serves
a range of (white) socioeconomic desires. White America depended on the
incoherent category of the “human and not-human,” which is also to say
the category of the subject represented by and within a legal regime that
simultaneously allows him no representational status whatsoever. But there
are at least two ways of thinking about this dependence, both of which
return us to a Hobbesian analysis. On one hand, we might think of the
conceptual position into which the enslaved African in America is forced
as a logical and legal absurdity and hence as a position of absolute subjec-
tion to the violent demands of an enemy. This would be the position from
which, as Hobbes suggests, a corresponding violence of resistance would be
“just.” At the same time, a Hobbesian analysis also allows us to appreciate
the extent to which the institution of slavery operates to isolate and confine
aspects of politico-legal subjectivity that liberal political philosophy needs
to disavow. The possibility of the slave, a conceptually new form of human
exploitation, has everything to do with the liberal capitalist disavowal and
displacment of Hobbesian sovereignty. The “artificial” soul of Hobbesian
sovereignty that signals the supplementary structure of citizenship in a
representational democracy (a Hobbesian commonwealth) morphs, under
the pressure of a liberal investment in the self-sufficient individual subject
of consent, into the undecidable humanity of the African American. The
black slave is like us and not like us; he or she is an “imitation human,”
an “animal” masquerading as a full human being. And so long as this state
of not-quite-humanity can be compared and subordinated to a phantas-
matically full humanity, it can also be exploited and disenfranchised. But
Hobbesian political philosophy suggests that if we have any hope at all, it is
insofar as we recognize our common reliance on a supplementary, artificial
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“life” that Hobbes calls sovereignty (and that I insist on calling democratic
sovereignty). Hobbesian sovereignty thus appears as a threat to any ideology
committed to associating quasi-humanity with a demarcated and degraded
subset of the social; simultaneously, any such victimized group always car-
ries within it the threat and promise of Hobbesian sovereign power. Which
is also to say that democratic sovereignty, if there is any, always threatens
to appear wherever something like a sub-, quasi- or artificial humanity juts
into view. The “monstrous” violence, or even the irrational, “anti-social”
behavior, of a de-humanized class of victims confronts liberal capitalist
power as the ghost of Hobbesian sovereignty coming back from the future.
The historically specific politico-legal invention called the “chattel slave”
is not simply the scandal of an emergent democracy (“how could the same
nation that pursued revolution in the name of certain inalienable rights also
perpetuate the horror of slavery?” is the ritually repeated liberal question);
it also identifies a living point of resistance to a particular form of coun-
terdemocratic hegemony. The resistance offered by the enslaved African
American takes place at the site of, and, indeed, produces the possibility
of, a Hobbesian alternative to liberal capitalist sovereignty.
From a Hobbesian perspective, Nat Turner (and all those resistant slaves
whose histories he has come to represent) takes up arms against an aberrant
political philosophy as well as against a socioeconomic injustice. But how
are we to read those aspects of Turner’s violence that still seem most
abhorrent (the execution of all white men, women, and children within his
reach)? The execution of children, for example, seems to stretch sympathy
and demands the invocation of categories of “justice” or “evil” that exceed
the demands of any particular project of political emancipation or even
vengeance. Turner’s insurrection, some might be tempted to conclude, like
Brown’s Kansas activities, exceeded some kind of limit and included acts
of “injustice” that could never be forgiven. Judgments of this kind can be
heard, for example, in the now-repudiated scholarly approach to Melville’s
story of slave revolt, “Benito Cereno,” in the mid-twentieth century.21 If
Hobbes’s definition of a state of nature as a state in which not only law
but even justice has no meaning, then surely the slaughtering of infants
would announce a descent into such a state? And this is indeed, I would
suggest, how we ought to understand such violence. The murdering of
children is surely one of the signs, in the story of Turner’s insurrection,
that sovereign order has collapsed. But a Hobbesian approach reminds us
that sovereignty had already dissolved in the slaveholding United States.
Kyle Baker makes this point, visually, in his graphic retelling of Turner’s
rebellion: reminded that an infant still remains in the house they have
just left behind, swathed in its owners’ blood, Turner hesitates and a
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picture is superimposed on his head – a flashback of slavers ripping a child
from its mother’s arms – before Turner heads back into the house. The
“terror” associated with Turner’s rebellion, in other words, is the terror of a
Hobbesian state of nature, but it is also the terror that had been nurtured,
sustained, and exploited by a slaveowning culture determined to profit
from the maintenance and control of that very terror. Slaveowning ideology
emerged out of a simultaneous disavowal of the Hobbesian state of nature
(with its insistence on the possibility of a deconstructed justice – violence
that would be neither just nor unjust) and a vicious exploitation of that
very possibility in the form of the enslaved African whose humanity could
be suspended or activated at the discretion of his or her “owners” and who
was subject to a violence that was taken to have no relationship to justice.
Nat Turner was not revolting against a form of Hobbesian sovereignty:
his was the revolt of a Hobbesian model of sovereignty against at least
two hundred years of counter-Hobbesian terror. There is a distinct and
crucial line of association that links the demonization of African American
resistance with the revolutionary demonization of the monstrous monarch
and the hegemonic dismissal of Hobbes and Hobbesianism as, in Bishop
Warburton’s words, “the terror of the last age” upon whose “steel cap”
“every young Churchman militant would needs try his arms” (qtd. in
Fiering, 256).
What I am calling Hobbesian sovereignty and thereby distinguishing
from the theory of sovereignty that underwrote the liberal, Protestant,
slaveholding Anglo-American world can be registered in a wide range of
scenarios and structures, from moments of revolutionary violence to fea-
tures of textual innovation. Take, for example, David Kazanjian’s recent
discussion of abolitionist rhetorical intervention and, in particular, the
significance of appositive grammatical structures in certain key texts in
the African American anticolonization tradition, including David Walker’s
famous Appeal. Kazanjian credits Fred Moten with alerting us to what he
calls a “black radical tradition” that functions in “apposition to enlight-
enment” and is “remixed, expanded, distilled and radically faithful to the
forces its encounters carry, break and constitute” (136). This approach,
which informs Kazanjian’s own emphasis on “articulus” in the introduc-
tion to The Colonizing Trick, begins with a definition:
An apposition is a grammatical construction in which two words, phrases
or clauses referring to the same person or thing and holding the same syn-
tactical relationship to the words around them are set next to one another,
without a coordinating conjunction. . . . As a figure for an equivalence that
is neither strictly factual . . . nor mechanistic . . . the appositive maintains a
certain tension between the two terms it silently links as well as a potential
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difference alongside the equivalence it implicitly asserts. . . . The apposi-
tive’s lack of a coordinating conjunction creates a potential break or rup-
ture between the linked terms, an uncoordinated gap that makes room for
the very remixing, expanding and distilling to which [Fred] Moten refers.
(136–37)
Kazanjian goes on to provide effective examples from Walker (“our greatest
earthly friends and benefactors – the English”; “our brethren, the Hay-
tians”) that emphasize what we might elsewhere refer to as a performative
linguistic potentiality. “In Walker’s passage,” explains Kazanjian, “the very
meaning of the good work of the English and the kinship of the Haytians
remains open, subject to modulation and resignification” (137). Kazanjian,
via Moten, claims this inscribed and historically charged “openness” for a
different kind of enlightenment, a black “appositional enlightenment” that,
I would suggest, picks up on a disavowed Hobbesian theory of sovereignty
and community precisely by reinscribing a noncontractual, supplemen-
tary, and performative sovereignty for a democracy to come. The “lack,”
the “potential break or rupture” that Moten and Kazanjian recognize as
central to this black resistance, is precisely the break with contract that
belongs to the Hobbesian sovereign and that has repeatedly been repudi-
ated as a kind of counterrational “arbitrariness” or “absolutist” force. The
“open-ness” that is central to “appositional” abolitionist rhetoric cannot be
reclaimed for a liberal economy of self-sufficient, reciprocating subjectivity.
As Paul Gilroy has written of slavery’s “expressive cultures” of resistance,
“subjectivity is here connected with rationality in a contingent manner. It
may be grounded in communication, but this form of interaction is not an
equivalent and idealized exchange between equal citizens who reciprocate
their regard for each other in grammatically unified speech” (57).22 The
illogic of the appositive’s open or empty coordinating conjunction thus
opens a place for the future as the absolutely unwritten (and hence the
absolutely dangerous) in the interventionist and transformative rhetoric of
antislavery agitation. (However modern they may appear,” writes Gilroy,
“the artistic practices of the slaves and their descendants are also grounded
outside modernity” [57].) Kazanjian, referring to similar formulations in
the abolitionist writing of Maria W. Stewart, puts it this way:
Walker and Stewart invoke silences that, like the silence between appositives,
allow a certain play of meaning. This play of meaning breaks the calculable
and codifiable character of formal equality. Walker’s and Stewart’s texts
return again and again to this break, I suggest, because it offers a certain
freedom to rearticulate the terms of the Enlightenment, a freedom to imagine
an equality that does not calculate and codify difference. (137–38)23
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Hobbesian political philosophy also complicates invocations of a uni-
versal “humanity” around which a new equality might be formed. It does
so, not because it resists such community, but because it insists that any
community must be thought in relation to a sovereignty that cannot simply
be included within the circle it helps to define. Discussing the concept of
equality in Versions of Antihumanism, Stanley Fish makes a forceful case,
in his own distinctive terms, for this aspect of Hobbes’s originality:
Equality in [Hobbes’s] account is not, as it is in the Enlightenment tradition
following Milton and Locke, a reason for denying one person the right to
rule over another. Rather, it is the reverse. Instead of subscribing to the
proposition that everyone is created equal and therefore absolute authority
is against nature, Hobbes says that everyone is created equal and therefore
absolute authority is absolutely necessary. (341)
But there is another way of registering this point, one that reads Leviathan
less as a proto-pragmatist treatise (less as Fish avant la lettre) than as a
deconstructive meditation on the political supplement. Equality, after all,
is a form of relation: it is only insofar as we share something in com-
mon (equally) that we can relate to one another at all. Some language, no
matter how minimal, must be shared for two people to enjoy anything
that might be called equality. Equality, that is to say, is always struc-
tured around a supplementary point of shared externality.24 What Fish
here calls “absolute authority” is also what Hobbes calls “sovereignty,” and
democratic sovereignty can be thought of as the necessarily supplemen-
tal structure of egalitarian social belonging. The enlightenment tradition
that Fish associates with Milton and Locke is not merely mistaken about
the relation between equality and absolute authority; its determination to
purge Hobbesian sovereignty from its political model exposes its refusal
(no matter how disavowed) to embrace a radically democratic egalitar-
ianism. Hobbesian absolutism, to reiterate, needs to be recognized as a
powerful early articulation of the concept of a social surplus – a performa-
tive surplus of egalitarian, co-operative democracy over the constative will,
desire and consent of any of the individuals who make up that political
community.
The sovereign as supplement functions within Hobbesian thought as the
means for inscribing a resistant historicity, or materiality, into any theory
or model of political organization. But this enigmatic sovereignty cannot
be entirely dissociated from the idea of community that it helps to effect.
Hobbesian sovereignty is irreducibly enigmatic and indeterminable – it
hesitates on the edge of our thought, disrupting categorization, blur-
ring borders, and refusing temporal or spatial closure. To metaphorize
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this sovereignty theologically (by, for example, identifying the sovereign
position with God or God’s will) is, for all its sublimity, to attempt to
domesticate and contain the force of this sovereign enigma. That which
Jefferson refers to as “God” in his famous expression of a vengeful justice
to come (“Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is
just: that his justice can not sleep forever” [Notes, 83]) can thus be read as
its own form of disavowal, a way of resisting, by translating, a concept of
sovereignty that would belong to a community of black and white Amer-
icans (an America) to come. Jefferson tried to put the face of God – a
familiar face, even at its most vengefully furious – on a sovereign force
that had always been there to be read in the faces of those who had been
enslaved. Higginson, for his part, read that sovereign force in the figure of
Nat Turner:
Was it the fear of Nat Turner, and his deluded, drunken handful of followers,
which produced such [terror]? . . . No, Sir, it was the suspicion eternally
attached to the slave himself, – the suspicion that a Nat Turner might be in
every family, – that the same bloody deed might be acted over at any time
and in any place, – that the materials for it were spread through the land,
and were always ready for a like explosion. Nothing but the force of this
withering apprehension. (Higginson, 269)
Contemporary critics of Hobbes sometimes suggest, as we have seen, that
his state of nature contributes to the discourse of dehumanization that
helped justify colonial and slave exploitation. But in fact, Hobbes demon-
strated no interest, in Leviathan, in dividing people up into degrees of
humanity. Rather, his notion of artificial sovereignty advanced the difficult
idea that what we might think of as a humanity we could live with (a
non-self-destructive humanity) might depend upon and come into itself,
so to speak, only via the sovereignty of the other. This way of philoso-
phizing human being effects a subtle transformation in the way we think
about the relationship between, for example, literacy and humanity in the
discourse of antislavery. Access to literacy, from this Hobbesian perspective,
would not simply name access to a mode of expressing a humanity that
the black American already enjoyed. Rather, access to literacy threatened
racist ideology because it exposed the irreducibly supplementary relation-
ship between “humanity” and the technics and techniques of writing, or
representation. Literacy, which is also to say, language, plays a sovereign
role (in the Hobbesian sense) with respect to what we call humanity. It
does not reciprocate a being in the manner of a contractual relationship
but introduces into the being it “represents” an arbitrariness (a chance and
a chance for another future) without which the language, and hence the
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speaker, would fail to function. This sovereign arbitrariness of language,
so crucially emphasized in Saussure’s linguistics, is anticipated in the lan-
guage of Hobbesian sovereignty as well as, we might hazard, in antislavery
revolutionary invocations of God’s sovereign intervention on behalf of
black emancipation. But this “prophetic” sovereignty is also registered, in
pro-slavery imagination, as the paralyzing terror of slave rebellion. This is
what it means to suggest that the enslaved African in America also served
to contain the threatening idea of Hobbesian sovereignty and Hobbesian
political philosophy. The slave is he or she whose humanity is repudiated
as supplementary and who can therefore function as a border figure for
any community that organizes itself around a counter-Hobbesian notion
of a contractual equality purged of any sovereign supplement.25 If we were
to ask, once again, where sovereignty migrates to in the avowedly post-
monarchic United States, we would have to add to our list of possible sites
the body of the enslaved African. White, liberal-capitalist sovereign power
thus operates via the body of the enslaved, because that body is both the
immediate source of economic (and political) power and the ideologically
effective form in which that power can hide sovereign force per se from
itself and from its would-be detractors. Hobbesian sovereignty is abjected
in the quasi-humanity of the racialized other.26
Which is also to say that the profound uncertainty and promise of a
democracy to come are also figured in “prophet Nat” and in the force of
antislavery violence. Antislavery violence is founding violence for America
and for democracy, as is all resistance to the “state of nature” generated by
the absence of a shared relationship to the sovereign supplement. Revolu-
tionary violence recalls Hobbes’s scandalous suggestion that there can be
a violence that is “neither just nor unjust” (“To this warre of every man
against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust”
[90]) as well as his further implication that this interruption or suspen-
sion of justice, figured by the sovereignty’s noncontractual excess, cannot
be exorcised from any commonwealth that attempts to put an end to this
perpetual warfare. Hobbes insists on the “mutuall” relation between demo-
cratic consent and a sovereignty that will always occupy an undecidable
temporal and logical position with respect to the community it founds and
preserves. If there is something impossible, monstrous, or even terrifying
about this sovereignty, it is not because it comes back to us from a monar-
chic or absolutist past that we are sure we have left behind but because it
comes from (and announces the possibility of ) a future whose sovereign
alterity also defines a chance for democracy and community. “There is
scarce a Common-wealth in the world,” writes Hobbes at the end of his
Leviathan, “whose beginnings can in conscience be justified” (486). But
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what might sound like a damning indictment of history’s unconscionable
violence is simultaneously Hobbes’s attempt to remind his readers that no
community can be sealed or redeemed by a justice that would precede (and
remain to protect) its borders. Insofar as any community imagines it could
“in conscience” be justified, it will do so at the expense of all those for
whom the community represents a democratic failure, all those for whom
those unjustifiable beginnings also name the possibility of another “unjus-
tifiable” revolution to come. Community, like any relation, interrupts the
circuit of justification that would preserve the sanctity and purity of a
“good conscience,” and in Hobbes’s Leviathan, this interruption also goes
by the name of sovereignty or the “artificiall soul.” Hobbesian sovereignty
threatens all those who would claim, in one way or another, to have reached
and occupied the “end of history,” and as such Hobbesian sovereignty, as
I have all along been trying to suggest, is indissociable from democracy’s
peculiarly constitutive incompletion, its precarious exposure to more and
other forms of democracy and community to come.
“From his early childhood until his execution by the state of Virginia,”
writes Kenneth S. Greenberg, “[Nat] Turner had found in his life and in
the natural world a series of signs to be interpreted. The comments that
he would become a prophet or that he was unfit for slavery, the marks on
his head and chest, his ability to read without being taught, and finally
the revelation instructing him to seek the kingdom of heaven – these
signs seemed to point in a single direction: God commanded him to lead
his people in a great battle against slavery” (2). Nat Turner, Greenberg
concludes, “was a ‘semiotic’ rebel – a man moved to action by reading
and interpreting the signs of heaven and earth” (2). As in the case of
Frederick Douglass, a striking combination of literary proclivity and vio-
lent resistance defines Nat Turner and marks him as a figure of charismatic
revolutionary violence. Turner didn’t just know how to read, he read the
world and everything in it as if such reading was a kind of revolutionary
action in and of itself. The possibility of another way of living together,
another America, was promised not just by the specific messages con-
veyed to Turner but by the very idea of the readability of nature (blood
on the cornstalks). Something in the very structure of the prophetic sign,
the enigmatic hieroglyph, announced the possibility of another sovereign
order, and aligned Turner’s revolutionary violence with an investment in
the political power of language decoupled from intention. That the matter
of the world might form the letters of a call to action or the promise of
another order and thus mediate between one moment and the next or
between one historically bound African slave and another suggests that
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sovereign power, as prophetic or semiotic power, always proceeds from
one or another instance of Hobbes’s artificial soul, which is also to say,
from the stuff and detritus of a finite world. If Nat Turner read God’s
will in these mundane signifiers then, it is perhaps because “God” (and
“God’s kingdom”) is also one of the names we conjur to figure the possi-
bility of a democratic sovereignty. And in his own way, Frederick Douglass
channelled prophet Nat when he broke with the Garrisonians not only by
refusing to endorse their pacifism but, taking even more of a chance, by
insisting on reading the democratic letter of the U.S. Constitution rather
than the intentional spirit of pro-slavery invoked by Chief Justice Taney
in the notorious Dred Scott decision. Whatever Taney may have claimed
about the racist inclinations of the framers, “The Constitution,” Douglass
insisted, “knows all the human inhabitants of this country as ‘the people’”
(“Dredd Scott,” 357). And it “knows” them, first of all, by writing them
into existence out of its artificial, ink and paper soul. Claiming America,
for Douglass, meant claiming the Constitution and, specifically, assert-
ing the co-implication of its radically democratic power and its sovereign
detachment from any governing intentionality. If this thoroughly textual
and even deconstructive move corresponded with a refusal to give up on
revolutionary violence, it was because Douglass knew better than most that
literacy was bound up with the imposition and appropriation of power. “It
was a new and special revelation” he wrote in his Narrative, “explaining
dark and mysterious things” [37]). Dark and mysterious things such as the
possibility that, with a wink of an eye, a written text, and not simply an
overflow of justice or good conscience, can be read to speak the citizenship
of the African American into retroactive and indelible being.
In the final chapter of Slavery and Social Death, Orlando Patterson cites
Maurice Cranston’s definition of freedom as “the absence of impediments
in the way of doing [something]” and suggests that slavery brought this
new understanding of freedom into our modernity. “Slaves,” he maintains,
“were the first persons to find themselves in a situation where it was vital
to refer to what they wanted in this way” (340). But, as we have seen,
this definition of freedom is also the one that Quentin Skinner claims for
Hobbes’s strikingly original and controversial version of counter-republican
political philosophy. In Leviathan, Hobbes repeatedly makes the case for an
understanding of freedom that lays great stress on what Skinner calls “the
distinction between external and intrinsic impediments”: “Freedom is now
said to be taken away only by external impediments, and fear is clearly not
an example of an external impediment” (Skinner, Hobbes 135).27 “When a
man throweth his goods into the Sea for feare the ship should sink,” says
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Hobbes, rewriting a famous Aristotelian example, he not only acts willingly
but, “very willingly” (Leviathan, Ch. 21, 146). By advancing this original
definition of freedom over the idealizing, Aristotelian model advanced
by Puritan Republicanism, Hobbes was able to identify the revolutionary
power concealed even in the bare decision to live on. And reduced as they
were, in an exemplary fashion, to the condition of bare survival, enslaved
African Americans had to believe that this power remained available to
them, too. “The condition of slavery did not absolve or erase the prospect
of death,” Patterson explains, “Slavery was not a pardon; it was, peculiarly, a
conditional commutation. The execution was suspended only as long as the
slave acquiesced in his powerlessness” (5). Hobbesian political philosophy
refuses to allow us to dismiss the latent power hidden in that “acquiescence,”
and Patterson’s book, as well as the immense body of African American
literature and resistance, testifies to the work of that power. But it is
the “ghost” of this same Hobbesian political originality, this Hobbesian
sovereignty, that, I think, also haunts Patterson in the final lines of his
great book. “Throughout this work,” he writes, “the ghost of another
concept has haunted my analysis, and in this final chapter I have tried to
exorcise it. That is the problem of freedom. Beyond the socio-historical
findings is the unsettling discovery that an ideal cherished in the West
beyond all others emerged as a necessary consequence of the degradation
of slavery and the effort to negate it” (341–42). This poignant intimation of
a ghostly and irreducible relationship between freedom and slavery hesitates
on the border of a Hobbesian insight into the supplementary structure of
democratic sovereignty. What haunts Patterson, I would suggest, is not the
impossibility of freedom or democracy without violence, but the intimation
of a freedom that could only be realized in being shared with the other. The
force and play, what Patterson here registers as the ghost, of an irreducible
alterity in the structure of democracy or “freedom” marks the co-incidence
of a Hobbesian commonwealth and an egalitarian, co-operative form of
social belonging. This is the ghost of a democratic sovereignty that liberal
capitalism perpetually seeks to dispell and that it is almost, but not yet,
impossible to read in the pages of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan.
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